Introduction
Is it" legitimate" and "proper" to Ilimpute existence tollor Ilattribute psychological reality to" the theoretical constructs of linguistic theories?
This is one of the main questions considered by Professor
Chomsky in his article "On the biological basis of language capacities" (1976) . Chomsky's discussion of this question may be seen as an attempt to clarify and justify the methodological bases of mentalistic linguistics. That these methodological bases are in need of clarification and justification has been pointed out over the years by various scholars. (1) Moreover, Katz (1977:564) has recently admitted that he does not fully understand Chomsky's position on the psychological reality of grammars.
This admission by Katz is particularly significant. (2) For, recall that he has co-authored with Chomsky a paper in which they attempt, among other things, to explicate the sense in which grammars may be claimed to be psychologically real.
The present paper critically analyzes one aspect of the above-mentioned attempt by Chomsky at clarifying and justifying the methodological bases of mentalistic linguistics. To be more specific: the object under critical scrutiny is Chomsky's position on the nature of the evidence timate!f and "proper" for Chomsky to II impute existence to" theoretical linguistic constructs. The argument outlined above is developed in 886-9 below against the background sketched in 882-5.
2.
Chomskyan mentalism (4) [s which for PRO to play sonatas on t ] (
)
To see what it is all about, consider the sentence (1) and the questions (2) and (3).
At the surface, this explanation of the ungrammaticalness of (3) appears to be a fragment of a straightforwardly nonmentalistic and formal grammar.
A lawlike linguistic generalization, together with a number of specific From these a which forms questions and relatives by moving such
(1) Violins are easy to play sonatas on.
What violins are easy to play sonatas on?
What sonatas are violins easy to play on?
as wh-movement Thus, in the derivation of (3), wh-movement moves a "questioned" constituent, sonatas, out of a wh-clause, viz. an infinitival relative; and by so doing it violates the wh-island constraint. Consequently, the resulting question has to be ungrammatical. (5) Let us call this explanation for the sake of later reference "the/Chomsky's wh-explanation".
fact-asserting statements, functions as the explanans.
To illustrate the method of mentalistic linguistics, Chomsky (1976:7) considers the following problem in connection with these expressions: Why is it that (3), unlike (2), is not well-formed as a question corresponding to (I)? Chomsky's (1976: 7-9 ) tentative solution to this problem boils down to the following: wh-clauses are "islands" in the sense that a rule such expressions as who, what, what sonatas, etc., to the left of a clause cannot be applied in general to a (second) wh-expression within a wh-clause.
At the stage where wh-movement applies in the derivation of the question.
(3), sonatas is a constituent of a wh-clause which may be represented as follows:
statement describing a problematic phenomenon Botha 3 the ungrammaticalness of (3) is deduced as the explanandum. Chomsky, however, takes a further step: he "imputes existence to" the theoretical constructs involved in the explanans. Thus he (1976:9) states that: "Tentatively accepting this explanation, we impute existence to certain mental representations and to the mental computations that apply in a specific way to these mental representations.
In particular, we impute existence to a representation in which (12) [= our (4) above R.P.
B.] appears as part of the structure underlying (5) [= our (3) above R.P.B.] at a particular stage of derivation, and to the mental computation that produces this derivation, and ultimately produces (5), identified now as ungrammatical because the computation violates the wh-island constraint when the rule of wh-movement applies to sonatas in (12). We attribute 'psychological reality' to the postulated representations and mental computations.
In short, we propose (tentatively, hesitantly, etc.) that our theory is true.
Have we gone beyond the bounds of what is legitimate and proper, in so doing?" By imputing existence to its theoretical constructs, Chomsky transforms a fragment of nonmentalistic, formal grammar into a fragment of mentalistic grammar. (6) And the crucial question, raised by Chomsky himself, is whether this is or is not objectionable.
Chomsky's reply to this question is in the negative. A proper answer can only, however, be given against the background of a clear and principled account of the methodological bases of mentalistic linguistics. Such an account will provide proper answers to questions like the following: (a) What are the objects in the real world which mentalistic (linguistic) theories grammars as well as general theories are theories about? (b) What are the aims which these theories pursue in regard to the objects in question? (c) What is the epistemological status empirical or nonempirical which the claims expressed by mentalistic theories are supposed to have? (d) What is the logic which is required for the validation i.e., confirmation and refutation mentalistic claims? of these Botha 4
Collectively, Chomsky's answers to these and related questions constitute what this paper calls "Chomskyan mentalism". (7) Let us consider these answers as they are given, implicitly or explicitly, in Chomsky's abovementioned article, and then return to the question of whether or not his imputing existence to the theoretical constructs in question is in fact "legi timate and proper".
3.
Objects and aims of mentalistic theories
Chomsky deals in a quite direct manner with questions (5)(a) and (b), thereby identifying the objects and aims of mentalistic theories.
As regards the general theory, or universal grammar, Chomsky follows Lenneberg in characterizing its object of study as "innate mechanisms, an underlying biological matrix that provides a framework within which the growth of language proceeds" (1976:2); as "the genetic program that enables the child to interpret certain events as linguistic experience and to construct a system of rules and principles on the basis of this experience"
(1976:2-3); as "the genetically determined program that specifies the range of possible grammars for human languages lt (1976:13). The aim selected by Chomsky (1976:2) for the general theory is to give Itan abstract partial specification" of the object specified above.
As regards (particular) grammars, Chomsky once again follows Lenneberg in characterizing their object of study as "a component in the system of cognitive structures" (1976:2); as Ita steady state of mind" (1976:3);
as "a mental organ" (1976:3); as "the particular realizations of this schematism l:i.e., the genetic program which makes language growth possible R.P. B.] that arise under given conditions " (1976:13) . The aim of (particular) grammars is described by Chomsky (1976:3) as that of giving "a partial characterization" of the object identified above.
Consider, in summary, the following integrated account provided by Chomsky (1976:3) of the objects and aims of mentalistic theories: "To put the matter in somewhat different but essentially equivalent terms, we may suppose that there is a fixed, genetically determined initial state of mind, common to the species with at most minor variation apart from pathology. In regard to this account of the objects and aims of mentalistic theories, a further question should be considered here: What exactly are the ways in which the characterizations offered by mentalistic theories of their objects are "abstract" and "partial"?
First, as pointed out by Chomsky (1976:3-4), these characterizations are "abstract" in the sense that they idealize their objects.
In the actual process of language acquisition or growth the cognitive system characterized by the general theory interacts with other cognitive systems. Similarly, in actual linguistic performance the cognitive system characterized by a particular grammar also interacts with other cognitive systems.
Neither the general theory nor a particular grammar, however, aims to give an account of this interaction. By so doing these mentalistic theories abstract away from the contribution of the other cognitive systems which interact with their respective objects, viz. the child's language acquisition faculty and the speaker's linguistic competence. In a nonabstract characterization of this faculty and this competence, it will also be specified how these two cognitive systems interact with other cognitive systems. (8) Second, according to Chomsky (1976:9) the characterizations offered by the general theory and particular grammars of their respective objects consist of "abstract conditions that unknown mechanisms must meet". That is, it is not the case that these characterizations describe "actual mechanisms"
"functioning in the brain", to use Chomsky's terminology. By implication, a nonabstract characterization of the cognitive systems in question will, somehow, specify" actual mechanisms".
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The characterizations which mentalistic theories offer of their objects are, then, abstract in a dual sense: in the sense of "abstracting away from the contribution of other cognitive systems lf , and in the sense of Ifbeing not descriptive of actual mechanisms". To the extent that these characterizations are "abstract", they are "partial U as well. (9) 4. Epistemdlogicalstatus it is a straightforward fragment of formal, nuts-and-bolts grammar. Specifically, it makes no ontological claims about any underlying reality, whether mental or other. As presented above, the wh-explanation thus incorporates no element in virtue of which a nonmentalist linguist would be unable to present it as a potential solution to the problem of the ungrammaticalness of (3). This wh-explanation is simply an ordered set of statements: some of these collectively constitute the explanans from which a statement describing the problematic ungrammaticalness of (3) can be derived as the explanandum. The view of linguistic theories called by Katz (1977) "Platonism" or the "Platonist Position" may be taken to represent one form of nonmentalism. According to Platonism, "grammar is an abstract science like arithmetid '(p.562) . A Platonist grammar does not characterize real entities such as idealized mental objects or processing systems (pp.565-6).
It rather depicts lithe structure of abstract entities" (p.566).
In order to turn the inherently nonmentalistic wh-explanation into a fragment of mentalistic grmrumar, Chomsky has to add a number of claims to those already incorporated in this explanation.. The claims which Chomsky adds to the wh-explanation are those by means of which he (1976:9) "imputes existence toll or ttattributes psychological reality to" the "mental representation tl (4) and the "mental computations" involved in the derivation of the question (3). These ontological claims made by Chomsky may, for short, be called "mentalistic claimrhypotheses". In sum: a nonmentalistic linguistic theory does not aim at describing a real object, mental or other; a menta- on empirical hypotheses such as these might derive from many and varied sources. Ultimately, we hope to find evidence concerning the physical mechanisms that realize the program, and it is reasonable to expect that results obtained in the abstract study of the system and its operation should c.ontribute significantly to this end (and in principle, conversely)".
The "initial state" mentioned in this quote represents Itafixed, genetically determined initial state of mind common to the species" that makes language acquisition or "growth ll possible, that is the so-called faculte de langage or language acquisition device. The "steady state" represents "the grammar of a language that has grown in the mind", i.e. the idealized linguistic competence of the adult speaker.
The Varied Sources Thesis implicitly adopted by Chomsky in earlier work as well (15) appears at the surface to be nonobjectionable.
Clearly, the more numerous and the more varied the sources of evidence for mentalistic claims were, the more thorough would be the validation of Here, too, abstracting away from these phenomena, objects or processes has two complementary consequences. On the one hand, data about these phenomena, objects or processes fall outside the domain of problematic data to be accounted for by menatlistic theories. On the other hand, it is implied that these data are irrelevant in principle to the validation of mentalistic claims about an idealized competence.
Thus, Chomskyan idealizations such as the two mentioned above do not only restrict the domain of problematic data of mentalistic theories. These idealizations restrict in principle the sources of evidence for the validation of mentalistic claims as well.
In fact, the sources of potential evidence for mentalistic claims are restricted, as a result of these idea- problem may be denoted by means of the expression "The Mentalist-Rationalist Paradox". The origin of the term "Mentalist" within this compound expression is obvious. The term "Rationalist" derives from the philosophy of science which underlies the use of the idealizations in question. (18) 7.
The nonnecessity of external evidence This brings us to Chomsky's second evidential thesis.
The Nonnecessity Thesis: It is not necessary, for the validation of mentalistic claims, to use, in addition to intuitive (= internal) evidence, other,nonintuitive (= external), evidence.
Expressed in The Nonnecessity Thesis is the essence of the following remarks by Chomsky (1976: 5-6) : "Challenged to show that the constructions postulated in that theory [i. e., a theory about the initial/ final state of the language faculty R.P.E.] have 'psychological reality', we can do no more than repeat the evidence and the proposed explanations that involve these constructions. Or, like the astronomer dissatisfied with study of light emissions from the periphery of the sun, we can search for more conclusive evidence, always aware that in empirical inquiry we can best support a theory against substantive alternatives and empirical challenge, not prove it to be true". Within this context, the evi9-ence which it is permissible to repeat, according to Chomsky, is intuitive evidence.
The "more conclusive evidence" mentioned in the quote has to be nonintuitive, We have seen in 82 that Cho~3ky appears to be aware of this difficulty.
Though he fails to discuss this problem explicitly, he does make an attempt to add something to the content of the claims incorporated in the wh-explanation.
Specifically, what Chomsky (1976:9) does is "to impute existence" to the theoretical constructs in terms of which these hypotheses are formulated.
From the quote presented in 82, it is clear that Chomsky does this by adding to the claims incorporated in his wh-explanation ontological mentalistic claims sueh as the following.
This problem concerns the empirical nature of the mentalistic claims expressed in Chomskyan linguistic theories. It has been shown above that a fragment of grammar such as Chomsky's wh-explanation is not inherently mentalistic.
To turn it into a fragment. of mentalistic grammar, a mentalist has to add a number of claims to those already incorporated in this explanation.
The claims added to those already incorporated in the wh-explanation have to meet a specific condition: they must be empirical.
Otherwise there would be nb difference in refutable content between a mentalistic interpretation of this explanation and a nonmentalistic one.
In the absence of such a difference in refutable content, the difference between a fragment of mentalistic grammar and a fragment of nonmentalistic grammar would be either terminological or metaphysical.
[ S which for PRO to play sonatas on tJ exists as a com- The fundamental problem with The Nonnecessity Thesis then is that, in an unqualified form, it reduces mentalistic claims such as (8) "We would now have a new kind of eviden~e, but I see no merit to the contention that this new evidence bears on psychological reality whereas the old evidence only related to hypothetical constructions. The new evidence might or might not be more persuasive than the old; that depends on its character and reliability, the degree to which the principles dealing with this evidence are tenable, intelligible, compelling, and so on. In the real world of actual research on language, it would be fair to say, I The sun's heat is produced by thermonuclear reactions that fuse light elements into heavier one, thus converting mass into energy.
(b) The basic solar process is the fusion of four protons + to form an alpha particle, two positrons (~), and two neutrinos (v); that is, 4p -7~+ 2e+ + 2v.
As ontological claims, these physical claims are ontologically highly determinate.
They describe a physical state of affairs which is uniquely identifiable. That is,the properties of theoretically postulated entities II "If "". "". can even be reproduced experimentally in terrestrial fusion reactors.
Moreover, the description given by these two claims can be made highly precise: the reactions produced by the basic solar process can be quanti-I fied, as in fact they are by Bahcall and Davis (1976:265) .
Consider now once again Chomsky's two mentalistic claims (8)(a) and (b).
As ontological claims, these claims are quite indeterminate compared to the physical claims (lO)(a) and (b (26) From this view of Chomsky's it is possible to derive in a natural manner the following ontological condition.
(11) The Performance Condition: A theoretically postulated mental entity cannot be granted existence or psychological reality unless it rrisput to use in speech and understanding rr or unless it "enters into the processing mechanisms".
This ontological condition has to be clarified in various respects. For example, the content of the expressions "is put to use" and "enters into" must be explicated in clear, nonambiguous terms.
As formulated above, The Performance Condition is nevertheless sufficiently precise to illustrate the way in which the content of Chomsky's expressions rrimpute existence torror rrattribute psychological reality to" may be clarified with a resulting increase in the determinacy of Chomskyan mentalistic claims.
In terms of The Performance Condition the expressions "to impute existence to X" and "to attribute psychological reality to X" have the meaning "to claim that X is used in actual speech and understanding' or "to claim that X enters into the processing mechanisms rr . This brings us to the crux of the matter: in order to make his mentalistic claims ontologically determinate enough that they will be empirical, Status Thesis, however, by implication makes it impossible in principle to adopt any of these ontological conditions. Consequently, this thesis blocks the way to making Chomskyan mentalistic claims ontologically more determinate and, thus, empirical. This, then, is one of the two principal ways in which The Nonprivileged Status Thesis is questionable.
The conclusion that Chomskyan mentalism has to adopt one or more ontological conditions bears directly on The Mentalist-Rationalist Paradox. In terms of such conditions, the Chomskyan mentalist would have to use external evidence for validating mentalistic claims. This mentalist, moreover, would have to assign a privileged status to certain kinds of this evidence.
As a result, the conflict between his mentalistic ontology and his rationalistic phenomenology would become even more significant. * This paper deals with one aspect of a cluster of problems which I discuss in more detail elsewhere cf. Botha ,to appear a, b, c;, David Lightfoot and Walter Winckler have subjected these papers to penetrating criticism.
They are, of course, not to be held responsible for the limitations of the present paper.
Walter Winckler, in addition, has suggested many useful improvements to the formulation of the former papers.
1.
Cf., e.g., Botha 1971:ch.4; 1973:ch.4; Cooper 1975; Derwing 1973: ch.8; Derwing and Harris 1975; Schwartz 1969; Steinberg 1975; Stich 1975. 2. Thus consider the following remarks by Katz (1977:564) : "The competencist might thus introduce principle R as the counterpart to A.
(R) A grammar of a language must be psychologically real in the sense that it represents an idealization of the knowletlgethat speakers of a language have about its grammatical structure, that is, it represents an ideal of their knowledge in the sense of M.
This, however, is not the only possibility. psychologically real in the sense that, given appropriate idealizations, understanding a sentence requires the recovery of its semantic representation" (Katz 1976: 560) . M, by contrast, refers to the following methodological principle: "As real conditions more closely approximate to ideal ones, the predictions of the laws formulated over ideal objects must approximate to actual observations more and more closely" (Katz 1976:563) . 5.
In a later paper, Chomsky (1978b:16ff.) attempts to reduce the whisland constraint to a more general principle, the principle of subjacency. This, however, is irrelevant to the present discussion.
6.
The distinction between a (fragment of) nonmentalistic grammar and a corresponding (fragment of) mentalistic grammar is considered in more detail in 84 below.
7.
Within a more comprehensive study of mentalistic linguistics, Chomskyan mentalism will have to be distinguished from other forms of mentalism, for example the mentalism of Katz (1977) , the mentalism of Bresnan (1976), etc.
8. It will become clear in 85 below that the idealizations in question are in fact more powerful: they abstract away from the effects of noncognitive systems as well.
9.
In later papers Chomsky (1978a; 1978b) repeats the essentials of the account given in this paragraph of the objects, aims and idealizations of mentalistic linguistic theories.
10.
For a discussion of some of the problems involved in choosing such conditions in a nonarbitrary manner cf. Bartley 1968. 11. In a later paper, Chomsky (1978b) equates "empirical" with "falsifiable in principle". In 85.1 of Botha to appear c', however, it is shown that Chomsky fails to explicate the latter notion.
separating 'the speaker-hearer's knowledge of the language' from 'the actual use of language in concrete situations', and it takes a grammar 'to be the description of the ideal speaker-hearer's competence, not of the us e of language ' (Chomsky (1965:4) )."
18.
At this juncture it is sufficient to represent Bever's (1974:178) quite general characterization of the methodological assumptions central to this philosophy of science: lIa) Specific factual phenomena are often the result of interactions among different (physical, psychological, biological) systems.
b) The formal theory in each system should be as limited as possible to be as testable as possible.
c) When a new fact can be described by two existing systems, but would require elaboration of one of them and not the other, the fact is interpreted as due to the system not requiring elaboration for its description."
19. This interpretation is borne out also by the following remarks of Chomsky's (1976:12) : It evidence concerning production, recognition, recall, and language use in general can be expected (in prin- How can a linguist have the option of doing B (the "Or" formulation)
if he "can do no more" than A?
21.
A further problem with this thesis concerns the manner in which it is related to Chomsky's thermonuclear analogy mentioned in 84 above.
This problem is dealt with in Botha to appear b:S4.l •
22.
In the "conventional" sense a claim is empirical if (a) its content is so clear that it has precise test implications; (b) there is, in principle, available" empirical" data with which these test implications may be confronted; (c) it is not protected by means of ad hoc devices from refutation. A claim that meets these conditions is said to be refutable or falsifiable in principle. Chomsky (1978b:9) also equates "empirical" to "falsifiable in principle".
23.
Note that evidential indeterminacy should be sharply distinguished from underdeterminedness by evidence. All empirical claims are underdetermined by the evidence that bears positively on them. This is so because positive evidence does not demonstrate or prove the claim(s) on which it bears to be true. Whereas an empirical claim is in principle underdetermined by the evidence bearing positively on it, a claim that is evidentially indeterminate is in principle a nonempirical claim.
24.
It is on this discussion by Bahcall and Davis (1976) that Chomsky bases the thermonuclear analogy mentioned above.
Botha 34 25. Also in his paper t1Atheory of core grammar il (197&:13, 16, 17, 22) Chomsky uses the expressions "mental computation ( Chomsky, Noam, and Howard Lasnik
